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Abstract In the present paper we focus on the two best organised ancient Greek 
federations the Achaean and the Aetolian. Both were democratic ones. We analyse 
their institutional structure, decision making bodies, and finances. Then, we compare 
them to the present European Union (EU) and point out similarities and differences. 
Lastly, we attempt an evaluation of the two federations and the EU according to a set 
of criteria, such as the existence or not of direct democratic procedures, single 
citizenship, common currency, common defense policy etc.  We conclude that the 
present European Union lags behind the Greek democratic federations according to a 
series of institutional criteria and thus, it has a long way to go in order to develop into 
a true federation. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally ackowledged that direct democracy emerged by the end of the 
6
th
 century BCE in Classical Greece, the first fully developed example being Athens 
after Cleisthenes reforms of 510-507 and the fall of tyranny (Hansen 1999). 
 Democracy appeared in a series of ancient Greek city-states such as the islands 
of Chios, and Naxos, and furthermore, in the city-states of Megara, Cyrene (in today’s 
Libya), Pontoheracleia (in today’s north-west Asia Minor), Kroton, Syracuse and 
Akragas, in today’s Southern Italy etc. (Robinson 2003, p.2; Kyriazis 2012, p.42). 
 What is less known generally is that within the same democratic environment 
the idea of voluntary federations of democratic city-states also emerged and was 
practiced from the 5
th
 century BCE but certainly and in a more organized way during 
the 4
th
 to 2
nd
 centuries BCE. Since the 8
th
 century BCE a series of religious 
amphiktionies, already existed in the Hellenic world in both metropolitan Greece (the 
Delphic, the Calabrian and the Boeotian) and three in the Asia Minor (Dorian 
Hexapolis, Ionian Dodekapolis and Aeolian Dodekapolis).    
 For Brock and Hodkinson (2000, pp. 25-26) “amphictionies had to do with 
“autonomous communities with common ethnic characteristics joined together around 
a religious center and containing a temple in order to establish effective political and 
military cooperation. The worship center was chosen to be in a geographically 
neutral point”. This neutrality for religious matters was a precautionary measure 
against any would-be city-state-member which might have an aim to undertake the 
leadership in the amphictiony against the other members.    
 It appears that an emerging democratic culture was under way during the 
Archaic period in many aspects of social life such as religion, property rights 
protection, warfare, sports (Kyriazis and Economou 2013a, 2015; Pritchard 2013). 
During the workings of the amphictionic councils, collective decision making 
procedures were taking place. For example in the council of the Delphic amphictiony 
each of the participants, the 12 Hellenic tribes had two representatives with voting 
rights. These representatives were discussing with their colleagues and taking 
decisions not only for religious matters but very often for a variety of other issues as 
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well, mainly foreign policy.
1
 Forrest (2000, pp. 282-283) adds that “the amphictionic 
representatives were being gathered together in order to discuss about internal and 
foreign affairs policies…we have a cooperation of communities around a ritual center 
where political decision were taken on behalf of all”.   
 Although Greek amphictionies are very interesting as paradigms of “proto-
democratic” procedures and collective decision making, they finally did not manage 
to evolve into federal structures where a series of key criteria are necessary to be 
practiced, such as common defense and security policy, an institutionalized 
parliamentary, direct democracy procedures, federal monetary policy, federal judicial 
service and common justice, single citizenship etc. The same goes for the so called 
“leagues” or “alliances” which were of course well known during the 5th  and 6th 
centuries, and even much earlier, since the Mycenaean Kingdoms who fought the 
Trojan war (during the late 13
th
 or early 12
th
 century BCE) were an ad-hoc alliance 
under a “supreme military commander”, king Agamemnon of Mycenae.2  
 But the concept of federations of free democratic city-states that unite 
voluntarily to evolve into a specific political unit with an appropriate institutional 
structure was completely novel in its width and depth. Many modern authors continue 
to call them “leagues” which is inappropriate, according to our view, since the 
political units which we will analyse here, are certainly much more than a mere 
alliance, thus we will define them as federations. Federations, like the Aetolian and 
the Achaean we analyse here, and many more, are attested already with certainty 
during the 5
th
 century, but what was new with the emergence of the 4
th
 century 
federations was their democratic basis, both at participating city-state and federal 
level, as well as their elaborate political and economic structure. Since at least the 4
th
 
century BCE we have attested at least five democratic federations, the Achaean, the 
Aetolian, the Boeotian, the Arcadian (which later became part of the Aetolian 
                                                          
1
 For the working of the Archaic Greece’s amphictionies see among others, (Herodotus Hist. 144; 
Pausanias Ell. Per. 19.34.I; Strabo Geo. 3.9.229; Cary 1923; Larsen 1944; Roebuck 1955; Rahtjen 
1965; Hammond 1989, p. 137; Forrest 2000). 
2
 For the Achaean Greek alliance which undertook the Troy campaign see Raaflaub (1993). For the 
Athenian Alliance see Despotopoulos (1972, pp. 35-37) and Cackwell (1981). For the Peloponnesian 
Alliance, with Sparta on its head see Cartledge (2012, chapt. 13). For the Greek Alliances of 
Macedonia see Larsen (1925). 
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federation) and the Aenianian ones.
3
       
 In the present essay we analyse first, as a case study, the Aetolian and the 
Achaean federations. Then, we compare them to the European Union and make some 
suggestions as to what lessons and institutional settlements for today’s further 
development of the EU can be drawn from the functioning of these federations. What 
we also attempt with this paper is to offer arguments in favour of a gradual revision of 
the wrong way through which we perceive those ancient Greek political entities. 
Recently, modern authors such as Mackil (2013) and Economou, Kyriazis and 
Metaxas (2014) have already adopted the term Koina the ancient Greek word, 
denoting a federal state instead of “leagues” to contribute to this revision. 
 
2. The Aetolian and the Achaean federations 
The Aetolian and the Achaean federations, are also known with the Greek 
word sympolitiae, which denotes that we are talking about cities who have common 
structures and share common values and institutional arrangements.  
 Recent estimates, which have been verified by the ancient sources, have 
proved that the two federations comprised organized functional federal entities since 
the late 5
th
 century BCE (Pol. Hist. 2.41. 7-8; Thuc. Hist. 3.102; Xen. Hell. 4.6.2-4; 
Mackil 2013, pp. 9, 46-52; Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas 2014). The main reason 
for their creation was primarily to achieve an effective level of defense against the 
geopolitical expansion of other states of the era, mainly the Macedonian Kingdom of 
northern Greece (Larsen 1952; Grainger 1999).    
 Gradually, during the 4
th
 century BCE both federations, which were also 
neighbouring states (see pic.1) expanded their influence and increased their 
geographical territories by the voluntary adhesion of city-states in the wider regions of 
both Aetolia and Achaea. The Aetolian federation comprised by more than 40 city-
states from Central and Southern Greece. The Achaean Federation expanded its 
influence since 280 BCE. It consisted of 10 member city-states to as many as 
approximately fifty later (Pol. Hist. 2.41; Rathjen 1965; Larsen 1972, Russel and 
                                                          
3
 For the first four cases see among others Larsen (1971, 1972), Rzepka (1999), Scholten (2000), 
Mackil (2013) and Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas (2014). For the Koinon of Aenianes see Strabo 
Geo. 9.4.11, 11.14.14. 
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Cohn 2012; Mackil 2013).       
 Both federations became major political powers in the Greek world during the 
3
rd
 century BCE but because of awkward geopolitical choices, and their commitment 
in the wider civil strifes of the Greek world during the whole 431-146  period BCE, 
they both weakened in economic, population, military and geopolitical terms and at 
last, they were finally subjugated by the Romans. Indeed, the Achaean federation 
gave the “last battle of the Greek independence” in 146 BCE at Leukopetra, where the 
Achaean federal army was defeated by the superior in strength and numbers roman 
legions (Badian 1952; Oliver 1978).
4
 
 
Pic 1: The Aetolian and the Achaean federations in 192 BCE. The Aetolian federation is depicted with 
the pink colour in the mainland part of Greece (right side of the picture) while the neighbouring 
Achaean federation with deep blue colour, (in the southern part of mainland Greece). One can also 
notice the Macedonian kingdom in the northern part of mainland Greece (with the light blue colour). 
Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman%E2%80%93Seleucid_War#mediaviewer/File:Aegean_Sea
_192_BC.png 
                                                          
4
 For the historical events between the 5
th
 to 3
rd
 centuries and the for rise and the decline of the ancient 
Aetolian and the Achaean federations, see Fine (1940), Grainger (1999), Scholten (2000) and Mackil 
(2013).  
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2.1 Political organisation  
Since both federations had similar political structures, we will analyse them 
together in this section. Both of them were utilizing a mixed system of direct and 
indirect democracy. Their main institutional body was the popular Assembly of 
citizens. Every male citizen aged 30 from every city-state could participate in the 
workings of the federal assembly, where he could vote through a direct democracy 
procedure, for crucial issues concerning the federation such as war and peace, foreign 
policy, federal budget etc.        
 There were actually two federal popular gatherings a year, the one in autumn 
and the other, sometime during spring. In both cases the first gathering was taking 
place in the capital of each federation, for the Aetolians being the city-state of 
Thermos, for the Achaeans being Aegion. In both cases, the second gathering in 
autumn was taking place in another city-state of the federation (Livy, Hist. R. 29; 
Davis 1978; Larsen 1952; Granger 1999). It appears that this “cyclic” procedure, had 
to do with an attempt to offer opportunities in every city-state of the federation to host 
the federal assembly, for reasons of fairness and justice.    
 The second main political body in both cases was the Council of (Greek: 
Boule), a preparatory body which set-up the agenda for the Assembly's meeting, 
having perhaps as a model the Athenian Council of 500. The members of the Council 
were elected representatives of the city-states (Polybius Hist. 2. 46. 6; 29, 23-35, 29. 
24.6; Livy. Hist. R. 35.34.2-4; Larsen 1972).     
 Day to day affairs of the federation were performed by a 10-member 
government executive board called demiourgoi, being democratically elected by the 
two pan-Achaean assemblies, with one year service. Head of this 10 member 
government board, which can been as a federal cabinet, was the Strategos, literally 
meaning the general, who was both the military commander of the federation and the 
head of the state. Two other high ranking officials of the 10 member board are attested 
for both cases , the hipparchos, (head of the cavalry), and the navarchos (admiral) 
who both served under the general.       
 Ancient sources attest also the existence of a grammateus (“secretary”) who 
may have been responsible for the up keeping of the general archives of the state, like 
the Assembly's and the Boule's decrees and laws (Larsen 1972, p. 183; Mackil 2013, 
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pp. 342-343). Probably, these three officials were part of the 10 member board of the 
demiourgoi.          
 Thus, from the short analysis we have provided here so far, we think that it 
can be easily understood that both our cases were comprising functional mixed 
system of democracy: Direct democracy when the federal assemblies taking place 
twice a year and when the members of the government executive board were being 
elected by it, and indirect democracy, when the members of the Council, were being 
chosen by their compatriots in their local city-states.    
 One very important institutional mechanism to enforce cohesion and 
democratic participation within the borders of both federations, was the isopoliteia of 
their citizens. Isopoliteia, which literally means “single citizenship,” meant that a 
citizen of one city-state, retained his political rights if he moved and stayed into 
another member city-state, a situation that clearly surpasses today’s European Union 
where a French citizen cannot vote for national elections if he moves say, in Italy. 
 Another innovative institutional settlement for the era, was the establishment 
of some kind of a federal Court of Justice. Such courts were empowered to solve 
political or economic differences arising among member city-states, taking over the 
role of intermediation. One customary practice was that a third member city-state was 
to offer judicial services so as to solve the dispute among the member-states (Ager, 
1996). The federal court(s) were also responsible for criminal and property rights 
cases possibly involving citizens of different member city-states (Larsen, 1972, p. 82). 
 
2.2. Economic organization 
Our information concerning the economic organization of the federation 
seems less than its political, so that in order to answer some crucial questions, we will 
advance some hypotheses. What is certain is that both federations were monetary 
unions such as the contemporary European Monetary Union (EMU), with the 
difference that Greek federations were also multicurrency areas: there was a parallel 
circulation of federal and city-state coins, as attested by the archaeological evidence. 
(Caspari 1917; Thompson 1939; de Laix 1973; Mackil 2013, pp. 251-252).   
Federal coins being minted by federal mints in different city-states, were 
probably used for federal purposes such as payment of the federal army and navy, 
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federal administration, federal buildings in Aegion etc. Concerning the issue of the 
exchange rates of the coins, we think that this issue can easily be solved by logical 
deduction, since the majority of the coins were made by silver, thus they had an 
intrinsic value so that the exchange was determined according to the silver content of 
each coin. We also guess that banks must have played a major role in the distribution 
of money into the market. Many scholars such as Cohen (1997) and Roberts (2011, p. 
130) have argued that not only the Athenian democracy but also the Greek world as a 
whole was highly monetized during the 4
th 
and 3
rd
 centuries BCE. Thus, we believe 
that the fourth century Athenian banking doctrines would have been diffused to the 
rest of the Greek world, during 4
th
 - 2
nd 
centuries BCE. 
 Concerning the setting up of the annual federal budget, we know nothing 
about federal budget expenses. However, it is logical to argue that such a budget did 
really exist because we have the evidence of the federal coins themselves as a proof. 
We guess as stated above, that the federal budget covered military expenditures, 
federal administration and buildings expenses and perhaps a few extraordinary 
expenses, such as public festivals. Concerning the federal revenues of the budget, we 
estimate that the Federal budget must have taken an important percentage of the, 
federation’s total GDP, but certainly much more than the 0.95% of the current EU’s 
GDP represented by the EU budget.
5
 
 In addition, another crucial element of both cases was the institution of 
enkteseis. It meant the right of ownership and property rights in another city-state 
(land and houses) and their legal transfer between individuals. This procedure was 
practically strongly reinforced in cases of intermarriage (Greek: epigamia): The 
groom could easily receive his dowry in another member city-state and establish clear 
and defined property right there. This was a widely accepted process in Greek federal 
states, such as the Achaean, the Aetolian and the Boeotian ones (Ox. Hist. 16.3; 
Mackil 2013, pp. 296-298, 499-500).      
 Thus enkteseis (property and civic rights protection throughout the 
federations), and isopoliteia (political and voting rights protection throughout the 
federations) were, according to our view, two basic elements, which can be found in a 
                                                          
5
 For the structure and relative estimations concerning the federal budget revenues for both federations, 
Scholten (2000), Mackil (2013), Economou and Kyriazis (2013) and Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas 
(2014) offer some estimations and additional references on the issue.  
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politico-economic environment which favours regional mobility of both human and 
capital and promotes commercial and economic transactions. Free circulation of 
capital (under a monetary union) and labour (under isopoliteia) which constitute of the 
two main economic pillars of today’s EU did exist in both the Achaean and the 
Aetolian federations approximately 2300 years ago. 
All these institutional settlements prove that both federations had introduced a 
series of advanced economic practices in relation to the other political entities 
throughout Greece. Except for the utilisation of federal coins which rendered 
economic transactions reliable and fast and the protection of property rights, another 
important institution, being also found in the Athenian democracy, was present: an 
institutional body called agoranomoi (those who check the market’s prices) meaning 
those who were responsible for protecting against exorbitant prices in the market (thus 
preventing profiteering) and who adjusted disputes between buyers and sellers 
(Mackil 2013 pp. 268-269). In addition, both agoranomoi and the federal courts were 
also responsible to monitor the legal binding of economic transactions and contracts 
(ibid., p. 272). 
 
3. The European Union: A comparison with the Achaean federation 
In this section we offer compare the institutions of the two Greek federations 
and the European Union. This is not an anachronism, since we compare our 3 cases 
under a specific set of criteria, which we consider as crucial for a state to be 
characterised as a federal one, and not by taking account of the total sum of various 
new institutions mainly having to do with the modern we examine the EU, which are 
of course much more complex and sophisticated than the ancient cases. Our criteria 
through which make the comparison are the following: Common citizenship, 
Monetary union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Federal budget, Democratic 
Structure and Federal Justice.
6
         
 To start with, from our analysis on section 2.1., it is evident that the Greek 
federations practiced direct democracy at both the local and the federal level, thus 
they can be certainly considered as more democratic. The EU practices representative 
                                                          
6
 For detailed analyses of the main institutional mechanisms of the EU one can read, Moussis (2008), 
Hix and Hoyland (2011) and Peterson and Shackleton (2012). 
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democracy at member-state level and through the European Parliament, which has 
only limited responsibilities. Second, our three cases were monetary unions. EU 
utilizes a common currency as far as the 19 Eurozone members are concerned 
whereas, the Greek federations utilised a parallel circulation of city-states currency 
(both federal and local). Thirdly, all three cases practiced, the free circulation of 
goods, capital and labour. The two Greek federations were utilizing isopoliteia and 
enkteseis, meaning property, citizen and voting rights in other member city-states.  
 Fourth, all three cases had a federal budget, to finance the armed forces and 
other public outlays such as administration and federal buildings. Fifth all three cases 
were offering an efficient regime of judicial services to their citizens. Concerning 
common foreign and security policy, the Greek federations were providing a 
relatively efficient level of common security and protection to their constituents, 
while the EU still needs to strengthen the so-called Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), because it is still underdeveloped.
7
 Table 1 summarises our 
argumentation above.        
 Finally, another pivotal diastasis of our analysis has to do with the 
legitimization of the EU institutions in the eyes of their constituents, or alternatively, 
with the dissatisfaction of the European citizens as to the political and economic 
institutions and mechanisms of the EU and to the rise of euroscepricism throughout 
Europe. The main reason is the series of austerity measures being introduced by many 
EU member-states governments, such as in Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
France, Finland etc.        
 Throughout history it has been proven that harsh measures under extreme 
pressure or even threats, have led to social uprising and direct controversy with the 
authorities that impose such measures to their constituents. A characteristic example 
from the European history, among others, has to do with the so called “Revolt of 
1381” in Later Medieval England, where the feudal authorities and the king were 
gradually imposing more and more taxes to their constituents, and simultaneously, 
they were trying to keep their wages in a very low level.
8
   
                                                          
7
 For this issue see Metaxas and Economou (2012) who provide additional references. 
8
 The king and the nobility were performing bad management of the taxes and they had been engaged 
in an unsuccessful and extremely costly war campaign in Normandy (northern France, which was still 
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Table 1 Comparison between the institutional organization of the two Greek federations and the EU 
Criteria Ancient Greek democratic 
federations 
EU 
 
Common 
citizenship 
Yes, isopoliteia No common citizenship yet 
Monetary union Yes, parallel circulation of 
both federal and local 
coins in city-states 
Common currency for the Eurozone members  
 
Federal budget  
 
An efficient federal budget 
Very low (0.95% of the EU GDP) 
 
Low level of social welfare and solidarity 
 
Common Foreign 
and Security  Policy 
 
Federal armed forces 
(army and navy) 
No efficient CFSP yet 
 
 no common federal pan-European armed forces yet 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
Structure 
 
 
 
An efficient mixture of 
both direct (the Assembly 
and the government) and 
indirect democracy (the 
Council) 
 
Indirect democracy  
 
Institutional bodies are appointed instead of being 
elected with exception of the EU Parliament 
 
Elements of direct democracy in national and regional 
level through referendums in some member states 
 
 
 
 
Federal Justice 
 
Efficient level of justice 
(Local and federal courts 
in the federal member city-
states and in the Capital 
 
Efficient level of justice 
 
European Court of Justice 
(Luxembourg) 
 
 
           
 This English paradigm concerning excessive taxation, proves the myopic 
policies that are still being applied in modern economies, such as in some countries of 
the EU, and more particularly Greece.
9
 There is no definite relation between increase 
                                                                                                                                                                      
under English control). The exorbitant taxation in combination with a policy of suppressing the wages 
of the Englishmen finally led to the erosion of their personal income and harmful effects to their 
standards of living. These feudal policies finally led to uprisings throughout the country, which 
unfortunately for the revolted was quelled in blood. Various other such uprising movements throughout 
Later Medieval Europe had the same painful result for the rebels. But the main issue here still remains 
that all these uprisings were the result of the “failure” of the system itself in the eyes of its constituents 
to gain their own conceptual and practical legitimization. For the implications and the reasons that are 
related with the English revolt of 1381 see Brenner (1976) and Dunn (2002). 
9
 After the Greek economic crisis manifested in 2010, the Greek policymakers undertook harsh 
economic measures such as tax on land property which is still into force, the so called “ENFIA” tax. 
All these measures have caused a social outrage because they were not introduced under a consensus 
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in taxation and the rise of the public revenues of a state. Laffer curve proves that after 
a specific point, when the tax rate increases, the opposite outcome occurs with the 
revenues that are being collected. Excessive taxation is detrimental for the prestige 
and the legitimization of a political entity to its constituents.    
 To return to our three case studies, the two Greek democratic federations and 
the EU, all successful federations are based on three fundamental principles, 
solidarity, trust and community of interest, both in the relations between their 
member-states, and the attitude of citizens towards, the federation. Where the three 
principles are strong, the respective federation shows great cohesion and 
legitimization in the eyes of its constituents. When they are weak or begin to waken, 
as in today’s EU, cohesion starts to suffer and the federation may be in danger.  
 In a reverse way of argumentation, the relation between economic growth and 
the promotion of federalism has been verified by the findings of a series of authors 
(Musgrave 1961, 1988, p. 187; Pauly 1973, 1988), while De Figueiredo & Weingast 
(2005) argued that two basic prerequisites are important for a federation to be 
established: First, there must be “gains” from participation and secondly, those gains 
must not be found aswell in other forms of political organization.   
 Such an argument is crucial, since it poses the strong prerequisite of a bottom 
up legitimization of a would-be federation by the society itself as a whole. If citizens 
have an active commitment concerning the selection of the political figures that shape 
the state’s policies, and they simultaneously enjoy an efficient level of income 
through a fair distribution of taxation burdens and welfare among the federal citizens,  
then they feel more responsible and more willing to actively participate in the 
formulation of public policy. In other words, they become more “active” as citizens. 
 These basic elements seem to be lacking in today’s EU, a fact that has been 
also noticed and raised among others by J. Habermas (2012), and we advance these 
preliminary ideas as a possible explanation, to be analysed more in future works. The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
building strategy, as would have happened with the cases of the Greek democratic federations, where 
direct democratic procedures were functioning as a “safety belt” concerning the introduction of any 
new state policy measures.  Thus, excess taxation measures being undertaken without legitimization on 
the eyes of the citizens have entailed as a result the gradual rise of extremist parties and the erosion of 
the EU prestige in the rise of the citizens and in the case of Greece, to the fall of the previous 
government and the formation of a new one by new parties, after the elections of 25 January 2015. 
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EU lacks a strong federal budget, common defense and armed forces and democratic 
legitimization in some of its major institutions.     
 We think, that a possible future achievement of such principles as those 
mentioned here by the EU, would strongly counterbalance the arguments and the fears 
of a portion of European citizens that still are afraid of a possible creation of a 
European bureaucratic “Super-state”.       
  
4. Concluding remarks 
 By the functioning and the analysis of the two Greek democratic federations 
and their comparison with the EU, a series of ideas arise, which can be seen as a 
benchmark for current EU integration issues: Firstly, more direct democratic 
procedures must be introduced at the political level, for instance, the President of the 
EU and of the EU Commission must be elected by universal vote instead of being 
appointed.          
 Moreover, the European Parliament, the only elected EU body, should have its 
competences further expanded. Thirdly, legally binding popular initiatives at the EU 
level should be introduced (and not as per Lisbon Treaty, only of a consultive 
character) as practiced in other federations like the Swiss, or some states of 
federations (such as for example, in California in the USA and in Bavaria in 
Germany). Fourth, the EU should take further decisive steps for establishing an 
effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Otherwise, the political 
integration into a federal entity will further be delayed and remain uncertain.
10
 
 Finally, the EU must undertake serious and decisive acts in order to face the 
eurocrisis. To achieve this EU policymakers must increase the the size of budget 
intended for the recovery of the European economies. The current available sum 
intended for implementing EU policies is without doubt very low, only 0.95% of the 
total EU Gross National Income (GNI) compared for example to USA’s 20% federal 
                                                          
10
 For the drawbacks of the European defence policies and the steps that they must be undertaken for 
establishing of a functional and efficient CFSP in relation to the US hegemony one can see Metaxas 
and Economou (2012). 
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budget to GDP for 2014 in nominal prices
11
 and Canada’s 250 billion of Canadian 
dollars for 2014, being equivalent to 15% of the GDP.
12
 Austerity measures in many 
member-states have negatively affected cohesion and solidarity in the EU level in the 
recent past. Citizens of member-states suffering under austerity measures, 
increasingly favour political parties that are against the EU, as Marine Lepen’s in 
France, thus threatening the future cohesion of the EMU and the EU.  
 We hope that this analysis and our suggestions may open an extensive future 
area of research and discussion concerning the future of Europe, which we hope that 
our paper helps to promote. 
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